Abstract: Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have recently argued that the evidential support relation should be understood in terms of explanatory coherence: roughly, one's evidence supports a proposition if and only if that proposition is part of the best available explanation of the evidence (2008). Their thesis has been criticized through alleged counterexamples, perhaps the most important of which are cases where a subject has a justified belief about the future (Byerly 2013; Byerly and Martin forthcoming). Kevin McCain has defended the thesis against Byerly's counterexample (2013, 2014a). I argue that McCain's defense is inadequate before pointing toward a more promising solution for explanationism. The Byerly-McCain exchange is important because it casts light on the difficult issues of the standards for justification and the nature of epistemic support. Furthermore, McCain's defense of explanationism about epistemic support represents an important recent development of the burgeoning explanationist program in epistemology and philosophy of science.
proposition is part of the best available explanation of the evidence.
2 That notion of evidential fit, plus evidentialism, suggests this thesis:
Best Explanationism (BE) S's evidence e justifies p to some degree at t iff p is part of the best available explanation of e at t or p is available as an entailment of the best available explanation of e at t.
3
Presumably, for an explanation or a consequence to be available is for it to be actually or potentially within the subject's awareness. That understanding of awareness allows for the possibility of propositions being supported by a subject's evidence when the subject has not thought of the propositions. It also prevents the support relation from extending beyond what the subject can understand. Consider complex logically necessary propositions. They are entailed by every body of evidence, but many of them are too complicated for many to understand. So, in order to be justified in believing any proposition on the basis of a body of evidence, the subject must at least be capable of becoming aware of the entailment between the body of evidence and the proposition which the evidence justifies.
Three more notes about the wording of BE: first, BE is a principle of propositional justification, not doxastic justification. BE says how a proposition is supported by evidence.
Whether the subject has a justified belief on the basis of some evidence requires the satisfaction of further conditions, such as a basing condition. Second, it may be that a proposition is well-supported by some of a subject's evidence, but the subject is also in possession of other evidence which defeats the supporting evidence. So the subject's whole body of evidence does not justify the proposition. BE allows us to make that distinction. 4 Third, a proposition may be supported to some degree by a whole body of evidence, but not enough to justify believing the proposition.
This happens in cases of underdetermination. Suppose that my entire body of evidence e supports p more than it supports competing available explanations q, r, s, or t. So p is the best That evidence includes these claims:
(E1) All observed golf balls rolling toward a cup in circumstances C have gone into the cup. (E2) That golf ball appears to be rolling toward a cup in C.
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According to McCain, the best explanation of (E1) and (E2), respectively, includes:
(BE1) All golf balls rolling toward a cup in C go into the cup. (BE2) That golf ball is rolling toward a cup in C.
These form the premises of a justificatory argument for the conclusion:
(BE3) That ball will go into the cup. First. Clearly, if the subject is justified in believing (BE1) and (BE2), from them competently deduces (BE3), and lacks defeating evidence, then the subject possesses justification for (BE3). The premises relevantly entail the conclusion and it requires little intellectual sophistication to recognize that fact. (BE1) states that all golf balls in C "go" into the cup. In order for justification to transmit from the premises to (BE3), which is a claim about the future, (BE1) must apply to the behavior of future golf balls in C. The universal generalization (BE1) makes no temporal distinctions. What is the justification for (BE1)? According to our reconstruction, it is (E1): all observed golf balls rolling toward a cup in circumstances C have gone into the cup.
Hume taught us that just because things have always gone a certain way doesn't mean they always will. Something besides (E1) is needed to justify (BE1). Clearly, if it is for the subject coincidentally the case that all observed golf balls in C have gone into the cup, that will not justify the inference to (BE1). There has to be some reason for the subject to think that the observed regularity will continue. This is not to require that in order to have justification for beliefs about the unobserved, a subject must have evidence that guarantees the observed regularity fits a general pattern. Indeed, the subject's justification may only make probable that the observed regularity is part of a general pattern. This justification may be defeated by future evidence, including future observations in similar circumstances where the previously observed regularity fails to obtain. The fact that the regularity might fail to hold in some future circumstances is insufficient to defeat the subject's justification at an earlier time for believing that the regularity would hold in the future, provided that the subject had, at that earlier time, good reason to think the regularity would hold in the future. 9 Regardless of how strong one's 9 Consequently, the standard of justification I am defending here is weaker than what Hume requires. In the Enquiry, Hume writes, "May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire?" (22). Hume is requiring that one's justification for a law-premise connecting observations with propositions describing general regularities must be so strong as to preclude the possibility of the regularity failing to obtain. Contrary to Hume, I am allowing that one may have fallible justification for the law-premise and still get justification for one's belief about the general regularity. Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me to clarify this point.
justification must be to justifiably believe a proposition describing a lawful connection between an observed regularity and a general regularity that would make probable the observed regularity, some such law-proposition must be justified in order for one to believe with justification that there is a general regularity. Thus, the universal generalization (BE1) needs to be justified by an inference from (E1) to a claim connecting being a golf ball in C with going in the cup as a matter of law, and from those premises to (BE1). Otherwise, there is no assurance that the behavior of future golf balls in C will resemble the behavior of past golf balls in C, and so (BE1) would be unjustified. And if (BE1) is unjustified, it can't justify (BE3).
Byerly agrees with this point. He argues that for his present evidence to justify (BE3)
would require subjects to possess justification for believing there are laws of nature which entail (BE3), but such justification would require a degree of intellectual sophistication ordinary subjects lack (2013, 239). Consequently, he thinks ordinary subjects are not justified in using descriptions of laws in their inferences. McCain agrees with Byerly that subjects are often not justified in believing there are laws of nature which would make claims like (BE3) probable, but
McCain claims such justification is not necessary (2014a; 6). 10 The problem is that the universal generalization fails to justify propositions about the future unless the subject possesses justification for believing the observed regularity will continue as a matter of law.
10 Here is McCain: "Nowhere in this explanation is a particular law of nature appealed to, nor does it seem that such an appeal is necessary… Additionally, while it may be that laws of nature explain the truth of the universal generalization (assuming that it is true), the fact that these laws ultimately explain the generalization does not entail that these laws must be part of the explanation. In light of this fact it seems that one can have an explanation available to her that includes a generalization of this sort without having the law of nature that explains the truth of the generalization also available" (2014a, p. 6). Below, I return to the issue of how detailed one's understanding of a law of nature has to be for justification. As we shall see, it is possible McCain intends something rather specific by "particular law of nature": he may not want to eliminate all requirements concerning inferences to lawful grounds of observed regularities. If so, it is unclear in McCain (2014a), as the remarks just quoted seem to suggest that belief in a universal generalization is sufficient to justify the inference in question.
In an instructive note, Laurence BonJour concludes his abductive argument for external world realism by saying that even if his argument works, and even if (as he thinks) the reasoning he requires on the part of ordinary subjects is not too complicated, it is unlikely people even implicitly work through such reasoning (2003, 96) . He concludes with skepticism about doxastic justification. BonJour's idea is that epistemologists ought to first identify the standards for justification, and then see what is required to meet those standards.
There is an important moral to be drawn from the Byerly-McCain exchange on this point.
Their debate is an instance of the epistemologist's concern with discovering the conditions under which subjects could possess justification, while hoping those conditions can be met by nonepistemologists. Those who seem to require too much intellectual work for people to possess justification are charged with "over-intellectualization" while those who don't are accused of making justification too easy. Part of Byerly's criticism seems to be that the standards explanationism requires are too high for ordinary subjects. In reply, McCain appears to lower the standards, instead of identifying a way to meet them. 11 McCain seems to worry that requiring too much cognitive work will yield a result similar to BonJour's: it is possible, though unlikely, that anyone possesses the relevant sort of justification. I think it is clear that justification for believing a regularity is lawful is required to justifiably believe the regularity will hold in some future case. Explanationism has to accommodate this while avoiding skepticism about justification for beliefs about the future.
11 But see below, where I consider a way McCain's position could be understood as accepting standards similar to Byerly's. As I said in footnote 10, if McCain intended the alternative reading, it is unclear in his (2014a).
The second problem is that McCain's justification of (BE3) One might reply that if enumerative induction is a kind of explanatory reasoning, then the justification a subject gets through induction is justification the subject gets using explanatory reasoning. Consequently, Byerly could use induction while BE remains unscathed. While analyzing enumerative induction as a kind of explanatory inference could be used as part of an argument that BE and proportionalism are analytically distinct, the problem remains: if those 12 Richard Fumerton has argued that inference to the best explanation is just enthymematic inductive reasoning (1980) . If Fumerton is right, there are no instances of propositions justified by explanatory inference that are not justified by enumerative induction. For a contrary view, see Harman (1965) . 13 One of Conee and Feldman's reasons for rejecting evidential proportionalism is that it seems to justify propositions made probable or entailed by a subject's evidence whose relation to the subject's evidence is something of which the subject is unaware. A response is that the mere existence of a logical or probabilistic relation obtaining between one's evidence and some other proposition is not sufficient to justify the proposition. For justification, the subject must also be aware of the relation. Conee and Feldman added an availability condition to their account of BE for what I assume is the same purpose. With the availability condition added to both the proportionalist and explanationist theses, it is not clear how the views are different if BE explanations are just disguised uses of nonexplanatory forms of inference.
forms of inference are not distinct, BE and evidential proportionalism are not competing accounts of evidential support because they justify all and only the same propositions to the same degree. So, BE cannot solve problems raised for proportionalism. To block the objection, explanationists must identify non-inductive justification-conferring explanatory inferences at work in our reasoning. McCain at least seems to allow that inductive inference is sufficient to justify (BE1) independently of any non-inductive inference. 14 His argument for (BE1) does not use any independent explanatory reasoning. While 'explanatory' reasoning justifies (BE1), so does induction. That threatens the claimed superiority of BE. There is a dilemma here for BE.
Either induction is a species of explanatory inference, and evidential proportionalism is no longer BE's competitor; or induction is not a species of explanatory inference, and BE is false.
Now for some replies on behalf of explanationism. To the first objection: explanationists should accept that beliefs about accidental regularities are insufficient to provide justification for universal generalizations. Therefore, subjects with justification for beliefs about the future have justification for beliefs about laws guaranteeing regularities observed in the past will continue in the future. Fortunately, that justification is not too difficult to acquire.
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There are two ways the defender of BE could try to accomplish this. What they have in common is the claim that ordinary subjects are able to entertain a belief that is simple enough to be within their ken, but which counts toward their justification that some observed regularity has a lawful ground. Regarding the first, what McCain explicitly rejects is that ordinary subjects must have justification for beliefs about particular laws of nature. For example, our golfer may justifiably believe the putting green lacks dips and bumps, the swing just executed will send the ball straight, and so on. This belief closely enough approximates, for the purposes at hand, a much more detailed group of propositions describing the behavior of the fundamental entities and forces whose cooperation is necessary (and possibly sufficient) for the putt to go in. The more detailed proposition has probably never been thought by anyone, and possibly never will. The golfer's belief approximates the complex proposition well enough for the simple belief to count toward the justification of the golfer's belief that the putt will go in. This notion of approximate belief allows the explanationist to require justified belief in laws of nature, but makes those beliefs easier to come by.
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The second way is to forego any requirement of a belief in a law of nature, and allow that subjects instead reach justified conclusions about the future through beliefs about lawful regularities. The content of a belief about a lawful regularity simply asserts a lawful connection between events, properties, or states of affairs. A thought of the form, "As and Bs always go together" is a thought about a lawful regularity. Beliefs about regularities are simpler than beliefs approximating propositions describing laws of nature. Importantly, beliefs about regularities do not necessarily approximate more complex propositions describing the fundamental workings of nature. A subject can form a belief about a lawful regularity of As and
Bs by inferring from the ubiquitous co-occurrence of As and Bs to some causal grounding or other underlying that regularity.
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Which of the two views is preferable need not be resolved here because the reasoning a person must perform to meet plausible explanationist standards is the same for both. In the golf ball case, the subject must have a sufficiently great number of experiences of golf balls in C going into the cup. Bracketing worries about inductive skepticism, the subject may then reason as follows: "(1) All golf balls in C have gone into the cup. (2) The best explanation of (1) seems to be that the behavior of golf balls in C is not accidental; rather, there is some causal grounding underlying their behavior. (3) Therefore, all golf balls in C will go into the cup."
Explanationists should deal with putative counterexamples this way: allow that subjects reason from observed regularities to a lawful grounding of that regularity, and from that ground to specific instances. Explanationists will have to argue (on pain of inconsistency) that the lawbelief is justified by inference to the best explanation. If the explanationist requires justified beliefs about particular laws of nature for the justification of beliefs about the future, then the reasoning the subject performs will have to sufficiently approximate a fully articulated belief about a law of nature; if the explanationist does not require that, then justified belief about a lawful regularity will have to be sufficient. In neither case is the required intellectual sophistication problematic. Whichever way one goes, one of those solutions should be acceptable to explanationists like McCain, and will allow them to defend BE without conceding to skepticism about the future.
While the responses just outlined adequately handle the first problem, I think the second problem remains unsolved. Even if BE and proportionalism are analytically distinct, BE is not a genuine rival to evidential proportionalism if BE 'explanations' are equivalent to disguised uses of other forms of logical and probabilistic inference. I am not sure what such forms of irreducibly explanatory inference there might be, and that is no argument against the possibility of their existence: but that no plausible candidates suggest themselves leads me to doubt there are any. It is up to explanationists interested in securing the independence of BE from proportionalism to argue that explanatory reasoning is independent of these other forms of reasoning. For without being told what distinctly explanatory reasoning is, BE is not a new
